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CROSSKEY'S CONSTITUTION:
AN ARCHEOLOGICAL BLUEPRINTt
BY HOWARD JAY GRAHAM*

Could it be fortunate that so much of history is a closed, or at least
a forbidden, book? Otherwise might we not squander our resources
reliving and refighting the past? The present soon would be unendurable, the future an endless re-marshalling yard for causes stretching back to antiquity.
If the first volumes of Professor Crosskey's study invite this somber
opening reflection, it is not that his achievement is unimpressive. Here,
undeniably, is a work in the great tradition of controversial writing.
Few lawyers -

and certainly fewer historians -

ever willingly have

assumed greater burdens of proof. Yet fewer still have contrived a
more ingenious tour de force, or written with greater verve and clarity.
Politicsand the Constitutionmay be a mistaken, and many will say, a
misdirected book; yet it unquestionably also is a challenging one an intellectual achievement destined to leave a mark on scholarship
for years to come.
I
Professor Crosskey's thesis and plan are outlined in an introductory
chapter, Our Unknown Constitution. This, by itself, perhaps is as
breathtaking a piece of academic iconoclasm as has appeared since
Spengler. The Fathers, it is first hinted, then in the 600,000-word body
elaborately argued, did not establish the sort of balanced federal
system that three leading members of the Convention- Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay - assured the country they had established when the
document was up for ratification. They created instead almost the
exact opposite- a unitary, centralized government in which Congress
was to be supreme and the states

-

potentially at least - might be

gradually reduced to little more than French d6partements or English
counties. Far from being merely the coordinate branch of a national
government endowed with special and enumerated powers, Congress
received in addition wide "plenary" and "general" legislative powers.
Delegation, in short, was both specific and general, precise and
elastic. Above all, it was intended that Congress be the supreme
department, and the government as a whole, a unitary, centralized
system. Hence, neither the tripartite separation nor the federal-state
tBeing a review of POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE ISTORY OF THE

STATES. By William Winslow Crosskey. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1953, 2 vols. Pp. xi, 1410. $20.00.
UNITE
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division was conceived to have anything like the significance each
eventually assumed.
Throughout his study Professor Crosskey stresses the merits and
simplicity of a government of this type. "So, if the Constitution were
allowed to operate as the instrument was drawn," he argues in his
concluding chapter, "the American people could, through Congress,
deal with any subject they wished, on a simple, straightforward,
nation-wide basis; and all other subjects, they could, in general, leave
to the states to handle as the states might desire." (p.1172). .Earlier,
he has assured us that "By 'a general national legislative .authority'
is not meant a power to supplant the legislature of any particular
state. The state legislatures were, in general, continued for local state
legislation. The general power apparently intended to be given to
Congress was a general power of nation-wide legislation; a power
to deal with matters, less than nation-wide, that transcended the
competence of a single state; and a power to deal even with matters,
confined to a single state when of concern to any other state, or states,
or to the nation." (p.363n.)1 Congress, in short, would somehow
simply peel off its powers as needed, and there would be little if any
nonsense about either adequacy or form.
Disregarding what certainly are some very loose ends in the outlined mechanics of federalism, 2 a most interesting doctrinal parallelism exists here -one that Crosskey himself has not yet stressed. In
1785, James Wilson, two years later one of the principal members
of the Federal Convention and eventually one of the original Justices
of the Supreme Court, spoke of the powers of the old Congress under
the then-existing Articles of Confederation, in the following language:
"Though the United States in congress assembled derive from thi. varticular states no power, jurisdiction, or right, which is not expressly
delegated by the confederation, it does not thence follow, that the United
States in congress have no other powers, jurisdiction, or rights, than
f
those delegated by the particular states.
The United States have general rights, general powers, and generki
obligations, not derived from any particular states, nor from -l th
particular states, taken separately; but resulting from the union of the
whole: .. .
To many purposes, the United States are to be considered as one undivided, independent nation; and as possessed of all the rights, and po.wers,
and properties, by the law of nations incident to such.
Whenever an object occurs, to the direction of which no particular state
1. Cf. pp.358-60. See also p387 (Marshall's "indefensible dictum" regarding enumerated powers in Gibbons v. Ogden).
2. The implication- and indeed the inarticulate, tactical premise - offten
is that, given the Crosskeyan reinterpretations, the Supreme Court woull. e
spared troublesome problems of linedrawing and umpiring the federal sJq n.
See the various caustic remarks on judicial "inclusion and exkclus16n' 6.2' "d
p.317);, and. the running attack on Justice Frankfurter, passim.
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is competent, the management of it must, of necessity, belong to the
United States in congress assembled. There are many objects of this
extended nature."3
It is quite evident that Professor Crosskey's thesis has features in
common with this so-called "Wilson Doctrine" of inherent, general
and unenumerated Congressional powers. Yet there are also pointed
differences. Wilson, of course, was speaking of congressional powers
under the drastically narrow Articles of Confederation; Crosskey, of
powers under the Constitution. Moreover, Wilson, a Scottish-trained
jurist of the Age of Enlightenment, saw nothing anomalous in a concept of inherent powers: arrangements of that order existed simply as
part of, or in the nature of things. Our generation of course cannot
endure such nudity of mind. Crosskey's proposition therefore is not
offered or argued as an abstract principle of jurisprudence or of
natural law, but rather as a matter of historic fact and framer-intent.
The burdens that James Wilson was willing and able to leave to God,
P ofessor Crosskey today must shoulder himself. He does so to the
extent of shifting them to the broad back of the eighteenth century and
of members of the Constitutional Convention. In short, the argument
of Politics and the Constitution reduces tacitly to this: the leadership
and majority of the Convention of 1787 held substantially Wilsonian
views of the nature of Congressional powers and delegation. Our
constitutional document therefore, whether regarded today as embracing inherent powers or not, at least bestows on Congress large
general and unenumerated powers in addition to those specifically
enumerated. It does this, because that was the Framers' collective intention. To be sure, no Framers themselves ever quite put it that way,
and some of them, notably Madison, later and repeatedly said precisely
the opposite. Even James Wilson, during his nine years as a member
of the Supreme Court, never repeated his Wilson Doctrine.4 And of
3. Considerationson the Power to Incorporate the Bank of North America,
in 1 TnE WoRKs OF JAmEs WILsoN 549, 557-58 (Andrews ed. 1896). The "Wilson Doctrine" is historically important in that it provided the jurisprudential
base for Theodore Roosevelt's "New Nationalism"; as such it was expressly
offered to and rejected by the Court in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 27 Sup.
Ct. 655, 51 L. Ed. 956 (1907). For contemporaneous discussion, see Alexander,
James Wilson, Patriot, and the Wilson Doctrine, 183 NORTH Am. REV. 971
(1906); the Wilson Memorial addresses in 55 Am. LAW REG. 13 (1907); Lindsey,
Wilson versus the "Wilson Doctrine," 44 Amv. LAw REV. 641 (1910). For fuller
bibliography, see Konkle, James Wilson, in 15 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 425 (1935).
4. See Lindsey, supra note 3; and Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3 MimN. L. REV. 289, 381, 452
(1919), reprinted in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 36, 40 (1938).
In his Lectures on Law, delivered in 1792, Wilson pointed up this "striking
difference between the constitution of the United States and that of Pennsylvania ....
The latter institutes a legislature with general, the former; with
enumerated, powers." 2 WoRKs OF JAMES WILsON 56 (Andrews ed. 1896).
But he added, "The powers of congress are, indeed, enumerated; but it was intended that those powers, thus enumerated, should be effectual, and not nugatory. In conformity to this consistent mode of thinking and acting, congress
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course John Marshall, the last and greatest of the Federalists, in what
generally is regarded as his master opinion - McCulloch v. Maryland,5
the very cornerstone of American constitutionalism - himself officially
expounded the doctrine that the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers. Yet all such evidence to the contrary notwithstanding
- and Crosskey recognizes there is a great deal of it, though he avoids
showing us how much - our Constitution really created a federal
government of "plenary" and "general" as well as enumerated powers.
The mood and thought of our introductory paragraph, therefore,
emphatically are not Crosskey's. His hostages are irrevocably pledged
to history even though the 18th Century obviously is to be a pretty
tough bargainer. What was thought and done, not just what was
said, must be determined, and this book is avowedly an attempt at a
full and unanachronistic re-construction. (p.7).
In Crosskey's view, the Commerce Clause was to have been the
keystone of the new edifice. Destruction of that clause, and the courts'
related refusal to construe the Common Defense and General Welfare
Clauses6 as a direct substantive grant of power to Congress - both
promoted and abetted by the Jeffersonian party -soon left our Constitution a shambles, hardly a caricature of what the Convention intended. Simultaneously, gradual shifts in word meanings overlaid
and disguised these developments.
The Federal Government today thus finds itself needlessly hamstrung -powerless to deal effectively with problems like employers'
liability, fair labor standards or anti-trust legislation. Worse still, the
nation is denied the obvious benefits of a uniform federal commercial
code and corporation law. "States Rights" doctrine thus consistently
lost every battle but the last one and is today almost as deeply and
offensively entrenched as ever. Actually Congress has - as it always
has had, and was intended to have -full power to regulate even
intra-state and local trade. (c.2).
By Crosskey's "unitary view of the national governing power," the
whole Constitution is of a piece with this theory. Following the brilliant salvaging operation performed on the Commerce power, (cc.2-9)
he goes on to find "oblique internal evidence" in the other clauses to
substantiate his thesis that Congress possesses power to regulate all
the "gainful activities the American people carry on." (p.521). Conventional views to the contrary are attacked at great length, and a
has power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper for carrying

into execution every power vested by the constitution in the government of the
United 'States, or in any of its officers or departments." Id. at 59.
5. 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
6. For Crosskey's "substantive" rehabilitation of this clause, and for his.
criticism of both the Hamiltonian and Madisonian restrictive or "purposive
interpretations, see c.14, The Constitutional Context as It Relates to the General
Legislative Power of Congress. This transitional chapter is an excell.ent epitome of the thesis and methods.
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breath-taking reconstruction of the Tenth Amendment 7 blasts that
ob~t4cle aside.
Volume 2 is essentially an alibi explaining why these interpretations
never have been realized and a sustained quadruple attack on the
Supreme Court for sins both of omission and commission. The Court,
says Crosskey, at a very early date surrendered both its supremacy
and its independence with reference to state and common law. It thus
in effect abdicated its responsibilities as the supreme juridical head
of the country in matters pertaining to commercial law, conflicts. etc.
(c:23-26). In recent years this process has gone to unbelievable and
disastrous lengths in such cases as Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.8 Simultaneously with these early developments, the Court established itself
as "the special and peculiar guardian" (p.1161) of the Constitution and
of private rights against the other two departments, expanding judicial
review far beyond anything conceived by the Fathers or required by
the nature of the government; and this too has worked badly. (cc.2729). Thirdly, the Court destroyed the originally-intended restraints on
state power, especially by refusal to interpret the first eight Amendments as binding on the states as well as on the Federal Government. 9
Finally, capping the record, the Supreme Court made exactly the
reverse error after the Fourteenth Amendment had made the Bill of
Rights binding on the states for a second time. That is, by its wholly
unwarranted development and interpretation of substantive due process and equal protection, the Court now over-restrained the states
and set itself up as a censor in the field of social and economic legislation, instead of employing the Amendment to protect Negro rights
and civil liberties generally. (cc. 31-32).
As Crosskey himself puts it in his concluding chapter:
"Viewing that record as a whole, it is apparent the Justices, over the years
since 1789, have very generally done things they ought not to have done,
and, quite as generally, left undone the things they ought to have done;
and, further to pursue the language of the Book of Common Prayer, it
does truly seem that, in their discharge of this important function, there
-has been no health in them." (p. 1161).
Ironically, there is nothing messianic about Professor Crosskey or
his theory, even though under the circumstances, one would almost
expect that there might be. For the upshot of what he is telling us is
7. C.22, The Tenth Amendment and the National Powers. Words frequently
mean just what Professor Crosskey wants them to mean. There nevertheless
were some Anti-Federalists-and even Federalists -who in 1738-89 stubbornly or callously refused to accept his "technical" meaning of the word
"reserved" as defined in the cited 1820 ed. of Sheppard's Touchstone (p.77, 80).
Cf. CROssxEY 701, 1352 nn.63-64, and examples cited infra note 30.
.8. 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 827, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). For Crosskey's critique,
see pp.912-37.
9. C.30. Cf. Professor Fairman's documented article-review of this chapter
in 21 U.

OF

CHI. L. REv. 40 (1953).
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that it has taken a century and two-thirds, plus two decades of research, to get the Constitution back on the tracks, headed the way the
Framers intended. It amounts to a sanguine act of faith, therefore,
to disregard such obstacles and continue to base theories of constitutional government on the intrinsic meaning and intent of the document
as historically discoverable. Time and distance can not be operating
in our favor, but error has been shown for what it is, and "True" intent
and "True meanings" are at last known. Truth and intent therefore
ought to serve us henceforth. Professor Crosskey's faith is staunch
and personal. Indeed, some readers will wonder at his rejection of a
"Higher Law." Yet the positivism is everywhere as strong and explicit as is criticism of the Supreme Court. Curiously, severest censure
is reserved for the Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, here
condemned as "one of the most grossly unconstitutional governmental
acts in the nation's entire history2' (p. 916). Yet it was in that case
that Justice Brandeis, for the majority, moved to correct what appeared to be, on the basis of Mr. Charles Warren's studies 10 of manuscript drafts of the Judiciary Act of 1789, a century-old misreading
of the first Congress' true intent!
Paradoxes of this sort help make Politics and the Constitution the
fascinating, provocative work it is. There is nothing timid nor equivocal in these pages. Understatement is an all but unexampled virtue.
Categoricals like "unquestionably," "absolutely certain," "there can
be no possible doubt"; helpers like "the absolute constructional necessities of the situation"-one which on its face proved something less
than "absolute"; compulsives like "must have known" and "must
have understood" - are scattered six and twelve to a paragraph, sometimes in sequences that cancel out bewilderingly. There also are
Professor Crosskey's strong partisan preferences."1 It might be unfair
to call them more than that, but if it ever should develop that his ancestors were Federalists, this book will be a telling new argument for
inheritance of acquired characters.
What we are given, in cantos scattered through the entire work, is
another version of the Creation and Fall of Constitutional and Judicial
Man. Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson
alternate as Seraphim; Thomas Jefferson doubles as Lucifer and
Satan; James Madison- "The Apostate" who faithlessly promoted an
Era of Good Feeling rather than stand true and lonely with the Essex
10. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARV.L. REv. 49 (1923); id. at 49-52, 81-88, reprinted in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS
or CONSTIOU ToAL

LAW

1246 (1938). Nowhere does Professor Crosskey discuss

or analyze the important textual changes in the drafts of Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act, which Mr. Warren discovered and presented; see instead pp.627
and 902.
11. Treatment of the Jeffersonians is a page out of the period itself. See
entries in index and especially p.779. Even the defects in the "mischievous"
and "vicious" [Federalist] Judiciary Act of 1789 are attributed to AntiFederalist maneuvering. (pp.610 ff. and 756).
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is Jefferson's sinister accomplice. Paradise [was] Lost in

1800. It has not been regained by our latter day penitence and tinkering. (p.l170). It will only be regained when the resurrected Federalist
Host returns to rout the forces of Darkness and Evil. Professor Crosskey's Puritanism is as pure and poetic as Milton's. He scarcely pretends to be writing history; he revels in "delving" (p.13, cf. p.6) into
it and using it. The argument throughout is that of a lawyer's brief.
Even the organization is selective, forensic, dictated wholly by personal interest, never by chronology, never by the immense body of
evidence some readers would like to see systematically and publicly
assayed. 2
The work thus leaves one fascinated and perplexed. None will deny
the Gothic splendor of argument, the wide ranging research and intellectual passion, nor the sweep and symmetry of the parts - at least
in the first volume. As a work of rhetoric, Politics and the Constitution
compares with Spengler's Decline of the West, and has the same air of
truculent dogmatism and infallibility.' 3 Purely as an intellectual
creation, it is more impressive still. One is reminded of the controversial works of the Reformation. And here of course is the rub:
Forensic genius, and intellect alone are not enough, for if they were,
Thomas More's Dialogue of Heresies14 would be one of the world's
classics. Any tour de force is a fixed, hazardous enterprise, vulnerable
generally beyond its maker's insight.
The issue, therefore, is not whether Professor Crosskey has produced a work of art. Unquestionably he has. It is not whether he has
provided a brilliant resynthesis and rationalization of our constitutional law. Again, obviously he has. His "unitary view of the Constitution" is neat, and to many, considering the problems and alternatives
we face today, will appear attractive indeed, limited to the ends
ProfessorCrosskey foresees. As a re-thinking of alternatives, and as a
re-channeling of precedents, this book would be a superb job. 15 Were
12. To call PoLrrIcs AND THE CONSTITUTION a "commentary" on the document.
as some have done, is misleading. Rarely does Professor Crosskey attempt
systematic elucidation, or summarize existing knowledge, or assemble and
weigh evidence pro and con. To get any systematic idea of the historical evidence and judicial opinion, one must keep at hand THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AmERICA

(Corwin ed., 1953)

(SEN. Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong.,

2d Sess.) and standard monographs. The adversary character of legal proceedings ordinarily serves as a corrective for law office history. As an historian,
Professor Crosskey temporarily is trading on a broad ex parte margin.
13. Note, for example, the treatment of Justice Miller, pp.315, 1127; and
Justice Frankfurter, passim.
14. Reprinted in MORE, ENGLISH WORKS (Campbell and Reed ed. 1931).
15. For appreciative reviews, see Durham, Crosskey on the Constitution: An
Essay-Review 41 CALIF. L. REV. 209 (1953); and those of Krash, Clark and
Hamilton in 21 U. OF Ci. L. REv. 1, 24, 79 (1953) (Politicsand the Constitution
- A Symposium). It is interesting to note that most favorable reviewers devote more space to Crosskey's doctrinal objectives, which they approve, than
to his supporting arguments and methods. Many readers might thus be willing
to "concur in the result"; but if that is to be the choice, why not leave out
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the United States starting from scratch, had Professor Crosskey been
appointed the Supreme Court's special master to overhaul the works
and develop a new plan of simplified constitutional practice in accord
with modern needs, certainly we all should have to honor both his
hardihood and his achievement.
This, however, is not the measure of Professor Crosskey's purpose.
As already noted, his argument is not based on mere expediency, nor
on persuasively-argued social and constitutional advantages. It is
grounded on history; and parts of it are offered as history. (p.6). We
are not told merely that this might have been, or ought to have been.
We are told that it was intended to be. Skeptics will wonder that any
thesis-rider's own preferences could have been so perfectly divined by
the Fathers; and cynics will go even further. Given our tendency to
read history backward, to find what we look for, and to overlook what
we please, several questions arise. What are the basic premises of
Politicsand the Constitution? What of that apparent antithesis in the
title? In short, is this another Dialogue of Heresies, or is it potentially
one of the wonders of all time: an archeologicalblueprint for Twentieth Century America?
II
First, some credits, debits, and historiographical notes.
Part III, the heart of the book, is a ten-chapter exposition of Crosskey's "Unitary View of the National Governing Powers." The "Scheme
of Draftsmanship" (c.13) of the Constitution as a whole is considered
in the light of accepted eighteenth century rules of documentary interpretation. (pp.369-84). This of course is largely an ultra-sophisticated
modern version of the Abolitionists' premise that the Preamble,
properly construed, is a part of the Constitution 16 -the part which
defines the objectives and which must therefore help determine the
scope. Accordingly, all powers granted the Federal Government and
all limitations placed on the states, have to be construed to "form
a more perfect Union, establish Justice ... and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." One need not be so acute
a lawyer as Professor Crosskey to see that this phrasing, at least in
combination with the Necessary and Proper and Supremacy Clauses,
is all anyone needs to fashion a commodious national power. Doubtless many citizens, distressed at the mounting complexity of our constitutional doctrine, and accepting, if not yet reconciled to its
apparently inevitable freedom of decision and "subjectivization," will
see gains, or even wisdom, in this turn to simpler, more flexible forms.

labored framer-intent and squarely face the issue as one of constitutional

power and expediency?

16. See, e.g., GOODELL, VIEws OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
(1844); GOODELL, OUR NATIONAL CHARTERS 5, 13 (1860).

LAW
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It will be noted also, that the prescribed tonic is one that can be marketed and taken in much less than these bottle-sized doses.
Most ingenious of all perhaps is Crosskey's 100-page analysis of the
Fathers' reasons for enumerating Congressional powers. (pp.409508). Some powers, he shows, had to be enumerated because in
dividing up the undifferentiated legislative-executive-judicial powers
belonging to the old Congress under the Articles of Confederation, it
was essential to indicate those to be regarded as legislative. (c.14).
Others had to be enumerated because under standing English law and
amendatory acts of Parliament, they customarily were regarded as
executive powers derived from the royal prerogative. (c.15). A third
miscellaneous group had to be enumerated for reasons inherent in
particular circumstances. (c.16). It is apparent, therefore, that in
general the purpose of enumeration was to make clear what powers
Congress was to have, not what powers it was not to have as against
the states. Crosskey lays great stress on this point, which of course is
the very heart of his thesis: Enumerated congressional power does
not at all preclude general congressional power. In fact, it is a condition of it. The judicial rule to the contrary is simply another instance
of the tales and "sophistries" propagated by James Madison until at
length they have become accepted articles of constitutional faith.
(p.12). By this neat and arresting section, the groundwork of Crosskey's thesis is laid, and laid moreover on much the same lines as the
Wilson Doctrine.
Here again, it is not necessary to accept the full interpretations to
pay tribute to virtuosity. Despite question begging (pp.406-07, 674),
pyramided inference (p.680) and the apparent assumption that anything in Blackstone must have been known and recalled at appropriate
times by members of the Convention, 17 even a skeptical reader soon
is prepared to concede that drafting the Constitution, given these
eighteenth-century political and legal backgrounds, was a more subtle,
complex undertaking, particularly for skilled lawyers, than generally
has been presumed. Just how many members of the Convention were
as sophisticated as Crosskey believes is the real question, for here
again we are given neither direct proof nor testimony. Perhaps from
the nature of the case none is possible. But even without it, these
chapters stand as brilliant analysis and historical reconstruction, and
will be read and debated for years by students of both historiography
and law.
Probably the most remarkable chapter in Politics and the Constitution is that on the Contracts Clause. (c.12). An extreme example of
Crosskey's positions and methods, it is the concluding part of a section
designed to buttress his thesis that the Commerce Clause actually was
intended by the Convention to give Congress power even over intra17. Much of Chapters 15-16 rests on this premise; see pp.411, 546.
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state and local trade -"over the entire complex of gainful activities
which the American people carry on." The basic proposition is that
the "True Meanings" of the Imports and Exports, the Ex Post Facto,
and the Contracts Clauses never were perceived by the Supreme Court,
even though several early Justices were former members of the Convention. In fact, all three clauses soon were judicially emasculated,
and this in turn has tended to obscure both the nature and extent of the
Commerce power. By no means all this section is heterodox, though
in Crosskey's view, interstate trade barriers were'the real target of
the Imports and Exports Clause. (c.10). Newspaper usage is cited to
show that in their true eighteenth-century meanings both "imports"
and "exports" embraced products from other states as well as from
abroad. Consequently, a restraint on the states' power t6 "lay any
Impost or Duties" on imports or exports without the consent of Congress except as needed for inspection laws, must properly be viewed
as an intended buttressing of the national Commerce power. Likewise, the two Ex Post Facto Clauses were intended by their drafters
to prohibit all retrospective legislation, both state and national, civil
and criminal. But here again the Court presently overruled the Convention, holding these clauses to prohibit only retrospective criminal
laws, thus defeating the framers' obvious purposes to outlaw paper
tender and debtors' stay legislation. (c.11).
The Contracts Clause, in Crosskey's view, was the perfect capstone
for this interlocking four-clause system as originally conceived. Above
all, it was the means by which the national Commerce power was made
"sole and exclusive." Far from prohibiting merely state impairment
of contracts previously formed - as judicially construed - the Contracts Clause really was intended by its framers to apply to all contracts. Moreover, its "literal effect" (p.355) was to crystallize, as of
1787, "all pre-existing state laws on the subject of contracts," stopping
the clock as of that date, and leaving the states free to diminish, but
never to increase, their regulations in this field. No direct evidence
whatever is adduced in support of what Crosskey, in one of his rare
understatements, acknowledges as "This somewhat arresting meaning
of the Contracts Clause." Its meaning, he declares, is "obvious." Moreover,
"its obviousness* is very greatly increased when the eighteenth-century
meaning of the Ex-post-facto Clauses is known. That meaning of the
Ex-post-facto Clauses was, on the basis of the evidence presented in the
preceding chapter, undoubtedly known* to the men of the Federal Convention; and since those men, and those of them, particularly, who originated the Contracts Clause, in the Committee of Style, were, in the main,
highly skilled and careful lawyers, it seems preposterous to suppose* that
this obvious* and undeniable* meaning of the Contracts Clause was not
known to, and intended by them. And if they did know and intend*
that meaning of the Contracts Clause, it is certain* they must have in-
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tended* to end state power, for all practical intents and purposes,* over
the whole subject of the law of contracts. Of this, no reasonable doubt*
seems possible,* and since a governmental system, with no part or
branch having any effective power over the subject of contracts, would,
very certainly, have been a great anomaly, the only reasonable conclusion* is that the skilled lawyers of that final committee must have supposed* there was a full and adequate power over contracts conferred by
the Constitution on Congress." (p.355) (asterisks added).
After the reader has recovered his footing and counted those little
asterisks, he begins to wonder: Does not this situation and argument
presume, logically and historically, that almost the first, and certainly
an indispensable, act of the new government of 1789, have been one
"for the national regulation of contracts"? At any rate, some sort of
stand-by or holding regulation?
If Professor Crosskey has discovered as much, or has even found
serious proposals for such, he certainly owes readers the information
immediately. James Madison, we know from frequent reminders,
was given at this date to "bluffing" (pp.406-07) and to carelessness,
but it strains credulity to think that even he, or, if he, that other
members of the Committee on Style and Detail, several of whom also
served in the first Congresses, 18 ever would have jeopardized the economic and commercial life of the new Republic, or the powers of the
new national government in this vital field. Or, if they did, that some
anxious insider or troubled litigant would not soon have reminded
them- or at least have capitalized on their oversight. Remember,
these men were "highly skilled and careful lawyers." And as Crosskey
elsewhere reminds us, they were capable of expressing themselves
and their every idea perfectly. Yet here we have them indulging in
this strange four-clause circumlocution, when what they really meant
to say was: "The Commerce power shall be sole and exclusive."
Fortunately everything worked out all right, because not a soul in the
land ever noticed the error -not even a Philadelphia Tory lawyer.
It must be acknowledged in this regard of course, that Professor
Crosskey has not yet clearly defined his positions with reference to the
nature of "sole and exclusive" versus concurrent power of Congress
in this field.19 As noted earlier in the quoted paragraph stressing the
flexibility of his theory, he seems to presume that virtually all delegated Congressional power was regarded by the Fathers as concurrent, and thus to be shared with and by the states until Congress
18. One-half the Senate, and eight members of the House in the first Congress had been members of the Convention -i.e., 20 of the 55 Framers served
in the first Congress. See HART, THE AmERIcAN PRESIDENcY IN AcTION: 1789
70 n.91 (1948) and authorities there cited. In addition, Jay, Rutledge, Wilson,
Paterson and Ellsworth served on the Supreme Court, Paterson until 1806.
Ellsworth was the leading draftsman of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
19. Cf. the discussion in the following passages: 1172, 363, 318-20, and
358-60.
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acted; yet Congress was not to supplant the state legislatures, "which
were, in general, continued for local state legislation." It must be remembered, however, that the members of the Convention in 1787
could not foresee later judicial rules regarding the "Silence of Congress," and that many such rules Crosskey himself at various times
attacks as the root of error and evil. Here again therefore, it is virtually impossible for us today, in wrestling with these problems, not
to reason anachronistically. Yet does not this doctrinaire "intent
school" 20 of constitutional construction require exactly that?- unless
the intent rule itself is to be an avowed anachronism? At bottom, it
is this conflict and anomaly that makes any "Back to 1787," "Back to
the true and original intent" campaign such as Professor Crosskey is
here re-organizing appear such an utterly hopeless, dubious enterprise.
Surely our burdens today are heavy enough without adding to them
this sort of extravagant exercise in historical mirror-writing and
mirror-reading. Professor Crosskey attacks Justices Holmes and Brandeis and their followers for "reasoning anachronistically about the
Common Law," and so getting us bogged in the morasses of Erie v.
Tompkins. (p. 9 10). Yet his own book is shot through with just such
anachronisms 21 - as any such book must be. We all need to ponder
Kierkegaard's maxim: "Life [and Law and History] can only be understood backwards. But [they] have to be lived forwards."
The extremely circumstantial and conjectural character of much
of Professor Crosskey's argument 22 leads one to wonder how far he
is willing to see such methods employed. It would be very simple,
indeed, using these techniques, to "prove" that framers of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated and understood the word "person"
in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to include both corporations and natural persons. 23 It would be no trouble at all to build
up a nineteenth-century glossary showing that corporations, since
Coke's time, had been regarded as artificial "persons"; were spoken of
20. For an excellent critique, see tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the
United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction,
26 CALIF. L. REV. 287, 437, 664 (1938); 27 CALIF. L. REV. 157, 399 (1939).
21. Like all practical men, the Framers thought concretely, and largely in
relation to the problems of their own day. To seek solutions for many of our
problems in the solution the Framers found for theirs is like looking to Goodyear (the vulcanizer of rubber) and Duryea (inventor of the horseless carriage) for the solutions to modern traffic problems. The Framers created
a going concern -and presumed that posterity's common sense would equal
theirs.
22. The Contracts Clause "must have known" argument, discussed infra, is
extreme, but by no means unique; see e.g., pp. 563-64, 679-80, 772. And after
chapter on chapter of the "glossary" argument, roaming over two continents
and through two centuries, what is one to make of the following caveat (made
with reference to the Corwin-Haines treatment of the colonial precedents for
judicial review): "It should be remembered that evidence remote
in time,
or place, from the Federal Convention is of little relevancy." (p.1368).
23. In fact, this was exactly what Roscoe Conkling attempted. See Graham,
The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 48
YiALE L.J. 171 (1938).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 7

continually as such by lawyers, judges, and even laymen; that members of the Joint Committee so spoke of them; that incidents occurring
while Section One was in draft raised the problem of constitutional
status. Nor would the objection that all this is irrelevant because
corporations cannot be "born or naturalized," and hence a doublestandard of interpretation is required for the two main uses of "persons" in Section One, be hard to counter: Over the years distinguished
courts and lawyers had disregarded far narrower, more precise constitutional texts in order to extend to corporations and shareholders benefit of state due process. One such case was Brown v.
Hummel.24 Its progeny were used in 1865 by Reverdy Johnson (who
a year later was one of the drafters of Section One) - used, moreover,
in a successful defense in the federal courts of the rights of one of the
very corporations (later in 1866) found petitioning Congress for relief. The framers were men of large views, well aware of the meaning
of words; they are known from their votes to have sympathized with
these petitioning corporations. If all this is true, they must have known
and must have intended to do precisely what Roscoe Conkling in his
celebrated argument in the San Mateo25 case intimated they did.
One gathers from his general positions on corporate personality
(p.43) and from his attitude toward judicial construction of the Fourteenth Amendment (cc.31-32) that Professor Crosskey would be little
impressed by this argument. His disapproval and skepticism would
be wholly warranted. All we have done - all he has done in analogous
cases - is to weave a web of conjecture and inference. Men and ideas
are placed on the same street corner, so to speak, or in the same city,
during the same year - or even during the same century- and the
inference is then drawn that they inevitably were linked, or were
mutually recognized or recognizable. But contiguity and simultaneity
of this order are not highly persuasive. At best they are not proof,
but merely the first conditions of proof. Roscoe Conkling simply made
artful use of the synapse-jumping, conclusion-hopping abilities of the
human mind. And it is hard to see how such use can be more validly
applied to 1787 than to 1866.
The point is merely that some of Professor Crosskey's records are
playable on either side. Moreover, there is enough question-begging
(pp.679-80) and non-sequitur26 in his own positions to make one patient and sympathetic with the Supreme Court. Three hundred and
fifty volumes written over a century and a half by nearly a hun24. 6 Barr 86 (Pa. 1847).
25. San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 116 U.S. 138, 6 Sup. Ct. 317,
29 L. Ed. 589 (1885).
26. P.406: Madison's membership on the Committee that drafted the Preamble and the Common Defense and General Welfare Clause makes it "utterly
impossible"
"candid." to believe that the views he expressed in Federalist, No. 41, were
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dred different justices, largely from the materials presented in the
briefs and arguments, pretty obviously are a rich mine of "sophistry"
and anachronism as well as of authority. Yet pretty plainly too these
are occupational hazards. The difficulties are inherent in the enterprise, and they are doubly inherent in that of Crosskey. It is as easy
to prove too much as too little.2 7 It is easy to believe at first that what
seems most vital to us today in Blackstone or Mansfield was known
and recalled at the appropriate moment in the Convention; that those
petitions referred to by Conkling bulked large in the framers' minds;
that the word "reserved" in the Tenth Amendment was "a technical
legal word... use[d] to indicate the creation of a new interest, never
previously existing as such, in respect of a thing conveyed,;" and not
as a synonym for "retained." It is easy, that is, until we get into the
jungle of these mens' minds and times - until we discover that they
were not always as preoccupied with these matters,29 nor as consistent, as we assumed; that "reserved" for example, also is found
used in many contexts as a synonym for "retained" in the discussions
of the proposedBill of Rights!30
One reluctantly concludes therefore that Professor Crosskey's positions simply are too over-extended for his methods. As a lawyer he
prefers to argue within the four corners of the document and its
clauses. (p.1173). As an historian, willy-nilly, and one assaulting
long-accepted positions, he has burdens of proof that cannot be met by
inference or four-corners reasoning. Many of his arguments have been
27. After a highly circumstantial section (cc.18-19) intended to show that
the Framers shared views of the common law and general jurisprudence
them toward keeping a very tight rein on the state courts, we
predisposing
6

learn (p. 10) that "some of these powers never have been enjoyed, in practice,
by our national courts"; moreover, that the [Federalist] Judiciary Act of 1789
was "diabolically contrived" to limit the national jurisdiction and render the
federal courts unpopular, and that "it is hard to doubt that these unwise features . . . were a result of maneuvers by the Anti-Federalist minority in
Congress." (p.756). See also pp.554-55 re Full Faith and Credit Clause.
28. P.701; see supranote 7, infra note 30.
29. The disinterest that business lawyers and leadership seem to have taken
in the draftsmanship of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, even while
simultaneously appealing to Congress for relief and for expansion of the
national jurisdiction, suggests that not everything clear to hindsight is equally
clear to foresight. And the reason is clear enough when one gets into these
men's correspondence and problems. Insurance leaders, for example, were so
preoccupied with agency agreements, policy suits, incendiarism, etc., that
most of them gave little or no thought to the opportunities that presently became so obvious and important. This apparent human blindness is one of the
most heartening facts in life. Problems generally are simpler and nearer of
solution than they appear-unless we begin refighting our whole constitutional history!
30. See, for example, THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS
538, 549, 551 (Scott ed. 1894) (James Winthrop, Agrippa Papers); id. at 774
(James Wilson); id. at 870 (R. H. Lee). The same papers are printed in
PAwVPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION (Ford ed. 1888) and EssAYs ON THE CoNSTITUTION (Ford ed. 1892). (These usages of "reserved" were discovered incidentally, and no attempt has been made to verify or disprove Crosskey on such
points).
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advanced and rejected by the courts over the years.3 1 They never were
presented as a "unitary view," nor as a coherent system because the
judicial process is not adapted to that method, nor need we especially
regret the fact. Historiographically, therefore, Professor Crosskey's
own book seems a powerful answer to his thesis.
III
The major jurisprudential premises of Politics and the Constitution
are the same nice dichotomy that has served so many masters of
forensics:
1. First and last, our Constitution is a legal document. It was
drafted by superb lawyer-statesmen-men supreme in their mastery
of law and expression. Their text is crystal clear, needs only to be
taken literally and as a whole to make perfect sense. Constitutional
meaning really is intrinsic. (p.390). Even the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which quite needlessly has befuddled the courts
and which some students3 2 lately have attempted to clarify by reference to its antislavery origins and backgrounds and to the prevalent
natural rights usages and concepts, is "clear in itself, or clear when
read in the light of the prior law." (p.1381). "[T]he ultimate question
is not what the legislatures meant, any more than it is what Congress
or the more immediate framers of the amendment meant: it is what
the amendment means." (Ibid.). Scholars and judges who ignore this
cardinal fact do so at their peril. (Ibid.).
2. Words and texts of course do sometimes have to be construed.
Here again the problem is one of arriving at the "true meaning" of
texts and language, or the "true intent" of the framers. To do this we
simply "delve into" American history and build up our "specialized
dictionary of . . . eighteenth-century word-usages, and political and
legal ideas ... needed for a true understanding of the Constitution."
(p.5).... Scholars and judges who ignore this cardinal fact also do
33

so at their peril.
These two complementary halves are joined neatly together in one
sentence in Crosskey's introduction: throughout the long inquiry
ahead, he assures, "the conclusive piece of evidence will be the Constitution itself, read as our specialized dictionary of words and ideas
will require. '3 4 (p.12).
31. The Wilson Doctrine, for example; see supra note 4.
32. See TENBRoEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AIVIENDMENT (1951); Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 479, 610.

33. See passim. Enumeratio unius est exclusio alterius.

34. One is reminded of the late Professor Becker's words, An "argument
subtle but clear, deriving the nature of an act from the intention of its makers,
and the intention of its makers from the nature of the act... ." BECKER, THE
EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 133 (1918).

1954]

CROSSKEY'S CONSTITUTION

The declared approach to fundamental law and its history thus is
frankly, even sternly, ambivalent. Equally vital in their bearing and
importance are several of Professor Crosskey's more detailed .premises
about the character and direction of early American government. Indeed, five of these more or less tacit assumptions deserve to be briefly
noted:
1. The Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia was a fairly homogeneous group, and had behind it a reasonably united country. No
immediate need exists, therefore, for analysis of the history and politics
of that time. Economic and sectional differences of course did exist,
but they assumed little real importance until later. Hence, they are
secondary to the main business, which is to determine what the constitutional text itself means. After that has been done, these auxiliary
35
matters can be considered.
2. The "true meaning" of the Constitution is the meaning it had avowed or not - to those strongly nationalist leaders, who as members
of the Committees on Detail and Style, hammered out the final legal
phraseology. These men- Rutledge, Wilson, Ellsworth, Randolph and
Gorham of the Committee on Detail, and Johnson, Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, Madison, and King, of the Committee on Style, together
with James Wilson, (pp.673, 1335-36) consummate draftsmen and
statesmen all - were more or less free agents, able to exercise their
best judgment without detailed accounting to the people; and that is
precisely what they did. Our problem today is to discover what their
intended meanings were, even where not explicit, and that of course
is the purpose of the eighteenth-century glossary and rules of construction.
3. Though the views of the remaining members of the Convention, 36
and of the people and ratifiers as such, are of little practical consequence
today (p. 1381), the historic and legal meaning of the Constitution
nevertheless was fixed, virtually for all time, save for processes of
amendment and correct judicial construction, by the formal acts of
approval and ratification. 37 Professor Crosskey thus takes both a
pietistic and a somewhat cynical view of the constitutional contract.
In fact, his scorn for the Jeffersonians obviously derives in part from
their outrageous success. They soon came to regret some of their
bargains, denied and haggled over others, yet still found overwhelming popular, congressional, and even judicial support!
4. The United States in 1787 were a nation well-suited to strong,
highly centralized government. This premise, to be sure, is almost
35. See p.1174; also c.l.

36. Crosskey promises a full reexamination of the Convention debates and
proceedings in future volumes.
37. Cf. passim, the criticism of judicial emasculation and "sophistry."
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wholly implicit. It would seem to follow, however, from the reverence
shown throughout for the extreme nationalist wing of the Convention.3 8 These men were the true statesmen and knew exactly what
was good 'for the country. The fact that they gave it this highly centralized government must mean that in their judgment and Professor
Crosskey's, that government was well-suited to the needs and desires
of the time.
5. The American Congress, which includes most of the ablest politicians in the land, has somehow been the unfortunate victim of a
century and two-thirds of "politics" and of "sophistical" interpretations
of its powers -many of them made or concurred in by its own members. Congress never has found its true place, nor risen to its full
stature in our constitutional scheme, largely because of various "warping influences" -specifically judicial emasculation and misconstruction of congressional powers, combined with outrageous judicial
favoritism for the states and an unwarranted assumption that the
judiciary alone is the guarantor and guardian of popular rights.39
It is fairly evident there is enough historical criticism and political
theory submerged in these premises to occupy doctoral candidates for
years.40 Premises 1-3 can be left for specialists in jurisprudence or to
historians of the Revolutionary-Federalist periods. 41 Numbers 4 and
5, however, are of a different order. Premise 4, in particular, assumes
positions quite at odds not only with sound administrative principles
and practice, but with the common understanding of our early history
and society. 42 Professor Crosskey evidently is convinced that his
38. Note, too, the premises in the sections on the Judiciary Acts of 1789 and

1801 (e.g., pp.610-18, 754). Cf. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS c.38 (1948), (especially

p.483). See infra notes 44:45.
39. See Crosskey's dedication (p.v), and pp.4, 12-13 and c.2.
40. Since Professor Crosskey must steel himself to this prospect in any
event- which is by no means unwelcome now that nearly every Justice's
constitutional opinions are scissor-syllabied a dozen times or more by candidates on as many campuses even before the Justice has left the Bench -we
suggest: "Crosskey on Constitutional Power" - i.e., is power an entity, concrete, everlasting, self-renewing, or does it have to be articulated with "Politics" to give us constitutional government? Does the Republican form of
Government Clause still mean what it meant in 1787? (pp.522-41). If so, then:
"Crosskey on Political Questions," "Crosskey on Non-Enforceable Constitutional Provisions" (i.e., just which Electoral College is our not-too-AlmaMater today- that of 1787, or 1952?). Above all, "Crosskey on Undisclosed,
Denied (p.712) and Unperceived Framer-Intent" - in short, "Crosskey's 'Conspiracy Theory'" and "Crosskey's Psycho-Analytical Interpretations. ....
The possibilities are exciting and endless.
41. Meanwhile, see tenBroek on framer-intent and extrinsic aids, supra note
20. See also the following standard historical works: HART, THE AMERICAN

PRESmENCY IN AcTiox: 1789 (1949); JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
(1940); JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING
THE CONFEDERATION (1950); NEviNS, TuE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER
= REVOLUTION (1924); WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS (1948); WroTE, THE JEFFER-

SoNIANs (1951); and the histories of Henry Adams, McMaster and Channing.
42. See especially WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS cc.1,15-16 (Post Office), cc.30-32
(frontier government and law enforcement), c.38 (communications) (1948)

and similar chapters in WHITE, THE JEFFERSONiANS (1951).
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eighteenth-century blueprint not only is adequate for our own- day,
but was as well (or even better) suited to the Fathers'. This means,
of course, suited to the needs and interests of four million artisans,
farmers and merchants, thinly scattered along a coastal fringe a thousand miles in length, frontiersmen moving constantly westward, hacking their way through hostile Indian territory, for the most part still
without decent roads and bridges, restless, land-hungry men, fiercely
individualist in thought, starting their federal administrative system
virtually from scratch, as yet without adequate post or coinage, dependent on uncertain sea and river communications, men jealous of
authority, rent by sectional conflicts and by state prejudices and
43
rivalries over trade, war debts and western lands.
It means, in concrete terms, that in 1787, when there was not even
a turnpike between Philadelphia and Baltimore, or New York and
Boston, and either journey still took from five to seven days, men
nevertheless were thinking about running the country from Philadelphia. It means that while President Washington was fretting over
official dispatches that had taken nearly sixty days to reach Governor
Randolph in Richmond," or General St. Clair on the Ohio,45 and after
Hamilton's whiskey excise had boomeranged and 15,000 reluct nt
militiamen had had to be dispatched on a two-months' march from
Philadelphia to Pittsburgh to secure the national authority,46 statesmen had courted more of this sort of thing.
Does Professor Crosskey really mean it? Does he really think a
national contracts law was conceived - or conceivable - for such a
society? Or perhaps merely for ours?
And does he believe that the Jeffersonian wave of 1800 was an unmitigated disaster for the American people? That it threw the nation
off course, hampered conquest of the continent and creation of stable,
enduring government?
.Historical speculation is idle stuff. But national achievemnts are
not. What happened following overturn of Hamilton's System? What
accompanied the nefarious repeal of that statesmanlike Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801? (pp. 758-63).
It is a strange story of national misfortune: 1803. The Louisiana
43. See works cited supra note 41.
44. "On October 3, 1789, he [Washington] sent dispatches from New York
to Governor Randolph of Virginia which failed to arrive until November 30."
WrITE, THE FEDERALISTS 191 (1948), citing 30 WASHINGTON, Walnlos 477-78.
45. St. Clair doubled as Indian Superintendent and as. Governor of the
whole Northwest Territory. In 1790 he had not a single clerk, managed Indian
affairs without an office and with the help of two deputies and two interpreters.
Marriage-, ferry-, tavern-, and Indian trader-licenses were a burden in
themselves, and, together with land and tribal affairs, apparently account for
the disinterest in a federal contracts law on the Ohio. See WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS cc. 30, 38 (1948).
46. See BALDWIN, WHISKEY REBELS (1939); 2 MCMASTER, HISTORY OF THE
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 41, 190-203 (1928).
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Purchase and the continent rounded out. 1805-07. Continued strong,
though scarcely consistent Jeffersonian opposition to a federal program
of roads and canals. 47 The Cumberland or National Road reluctantly
commenced. Construction simple enough, but routing and location a
nightmare of state-community rivalry, dictation and "logrolling":
Maryland v. Pennsylvania; Uniontown v. Washington, Pennsylvania;
Washington v. Wheeling; Wheeling v. Steubenville and so on across
Ohio and Indiana to Vandalia, finally reached, 1838.48 Meanwhile,
4000 miles of turnpikes completed in New York alone by 1821; 1800
more in Pennsylvania; and other states in proportion; by 1830 practically all main arteries turnpiked, wholly by state and private enterprise. 49
1808. Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin's Report on Internal Improvements, 50 a farsighted plan for a $20,000,000 national system of
canals and postroads to be built over a decade - destined only to
gather dust in congressional committees. Nevertheless, 3326 miles of
canals constructed by 1840, at a total cost of $125,000,000, all built by
state and private capital.51
1817. Madison's puzzling flip-flop on federally-sponsored internal
improvements: "With a degree of inconsistency extreme even for
him," as Professor Crosskey puts it (p.234), the President vetoed the
program he had initiated -the so-called "Bonus Bill," sponsored by,
of all people, Calhoun, and one which was to have been financed from
the $1,500,000 bonus received from the Bank of the United States for
its charter. Nevertheless, the 364-mile, seven million dollar Erie
Canal, built by New York State alone during the next eight years: and
another 2000 miles constructed in the country during the Thirties,
inspired by the New Yorkers' example.52
53
1822. President Monroe's veto of the Cumberland Road repairs bill.

1830. President Jackson's veto of the Maysville Road appropriation, on
grounds of inexpediency rather than defect of power (Jackson was
impressed by bills for $106 millions for local improvements pending
in Congress, with petitions and memorials received for another hun47. For the doctrinal and legislative history of the Internal Improvements

controversy, see Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress, 36 HARV. L. REV.
548 (1923), reprinted in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 565 (1938).

48.

YOUNG, POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY OF THE CUMBERLAND ROAD

(1902), especially pp. 20-55.

49. See TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, 1815-60 (1952) (an excellent, fully documented work); and DURRENBERGER, TURNPIKES (1931); LUXON,
NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER (1947) (indexes and summarizes material in that
magazine).
50. AlvWRIcAN STATE PAPERS: MSCELLANEOUS I, 724 (1834); 3 McMAsTERS, op.
cit. supra note 46, at 473-75; WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS c.31 (1951).
51. TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 49, at c.3.
52. Ibid.
53. 2 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 142 (1904).
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dred millions.) .54 In short, the Improvements half of Clay's "American
System" challenged and aborted in his own state. Yet, a decade later,
in 1840 -barely fifteen years after construction of the first railroad
in England - 3300 miles of completed track in the United States,
agaTmst 1800 for all Europe. The Philadelphia-Baltimore-New York
trade rivalry - quickened of course by the Erie Canal - stoked state
competition and established the national pattern: by 1838, $43 millions
of state debts attributable to railroad subsidies, with county and
municipal aid perhaps greater, and half the early railroads' original
construction capital estimated to have come from public sources. 55
The heart of it is simply that even Federalist Congresses didn't do
the things Professor Crosskey's historical theory demands; because
they couldn't do them. 56 Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Congresses didn't
do them, and weren't permitted to do them, because leaders sensed it
fortunately was unnecessary to do them.
Historical causation is quite as complex as speculation is futile. It
can be very plausibly argued however, that Americans got these things
so soon, and in such generous measure, because the thousands of state
and local rivalries and drives were capitalized and given outlet directly, not dammed up or dragged before Congress to fester and
exacerbate sectional and local feelings as had the Cumberland Road.
It can be argued very logically that our whole "Transportation Revolution" of the pre-Civil War period would have been utterly stymied
had it been left dependent on affirmative action by Congress. It can
be argued that the Union stood in the end because economics knit and
held the sections together, even as politics was throwing them apart.
The plain fact is that "States Rights" during the period 1790-1830
was not the sterile, negative, futilitarian dodge it so often is today,
or so often later became where slavery and race problems were involved. This is dramatically shown in Professor Hartz' study of the
internal improvements situation in Pennsylvania.5 The popular notion that this period was one of laissez-faire and non-interference is
here demolished as pure myth. State and local government activated
54. 2 id. at 482 (veto message of May 27, 1830); 2 id. at 97, 120 (annual message of Dec. 1, 1834).
55. TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 49, at c.5, especially pp.92-96, and authorities
there cited.
56. "The improvement of roads and bridges was within the grasp of the
technical knowledge of the period. Time and money and resolution were
required, and all were available. But the Federalist years ran their course
with no action on a matter that some saw already to be a national problem."
WHimm, THE FEDERALISTS 487 (1948). For the history of one of the main early
and largely unsuccessful attempts at Federalist promotion (development of the
SUNDERLiN, THE GREAT NATIONAL PROJECT: A HISTORY OF THE
CHESAPEAKE AND OMO CANAL (1946). This project dated from 1785, and George

Potomac), see

Washington was one of the original backers, yet state charters, state permission and state legislation were sought.
57. HARTZ, EcoONvzc PoLicy AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, PENNSYLVANIA, 17761860. (1948) (one of the most illuminating syntheses yet made of American
constitutional and economic history).
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the whole improvements program; constitutional theory and economic
practice were rich, varied, and closely interwoven. It is gross falsification to presume that States Rightism then meant inaction and evasion.
Federalism worked precisely because state policy was vigorous and
affirmative. The states were willing and able to do the jobs, and did
them, spectacularly.
Congress, on the other hand, was not able to do them, could not get
down to them, did not know how to deal with them, had neither
reason nor means to tackle them. Furthermore, Congress' deficiencies
in these respects sprang less from constitutional scruples or uncertainty, than from sheer economic and political geography or arithmetic. There is no occasion whatever to make Jefferson, Madison and
Jackson, or the Taney and Chase Courts, villains, or the American
people their dupes or accomplices- least of all Congress the innocent
victim- in order to explain this situation. Several examples will
reveal why.
River steamboating gave Americans their first real taste of "Commerce among the States."5 8 By 1820 seventy vessels were operating in
the West alone; during the Thirties and Forties the steamboat dominated internal transport. Frightful boiler explosions occurred with
monotonous regularity. Gibbons v. Ogden59 of course had given Congress its cue in 1824. Clamor for congressional action began in that
year. Bills were introduced and considered in every Congress. State
and municipal regulation was a farce- unconstitutional by any test.
Yet not until 1838 did Congress manage to pass even a token act, and
that one of the strangest specimens ever: Some well-meaning provisions for lifeboats and unspecified navigation lights; for periodic
inspections of boilers, hulls and machinery; yet with no requirement
for hydrologic tests; with the choice of inspectors entrusted to the
federal district judge, and with each inspector operating solely on his
own, and dependent on fees for income.6 0 Not until another fourteen
years, and more than a hundred fatal explosions later, did Congress
finally pass the Act of 1852 licensing engineers and pilots, and creating
a coordinated, supervised inspection service.6 1
On its face, this evidence alone pretty strongly intimates that the
historic flabbiness of the Commerce power, and indeed the want of
attractive symmetry in the whole Congressional torso, is traceable to
something besides the limitations and distortions of the Supreme
Court's modern "interstate theory" of Commerce. Something more
58. See HUNTER, STEAMBoATs oN THE WEsTmER RIVERs (1949), especially c.13,
The Movement for Steamboat Regulation, an elaborately documented account
that would enliven many class discussions of federal regulation and government and business.
59. 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (U.S. 1824).
60. 5 STAT. 304-06 (1838).
61. 10 STAT. 61-75 (1852).
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than Madisonian and judicial "sophistry," and changes in word meanings, is indicated here.
Samuel F. B. Morse, inventor of the telegraph, tried for years to
interest Congress in his invention. A $30,000 appropriation for an
experimental line from Washington to Baltimore demonstrated the
feasibility and pointed up the relation to the postal system. Editors
and statesmen urged federal action. Morse repeatedly offered his
patents for about $100,000. Yet the crucial Baltimore-New York extension bill failed to pass the Rouse in 1844. The Mexican War intervened.
Private capital took over, lines crossed and crisscrossed the country,
1846-50, and spanned it, 1863. This was all done in a "wonderful era
of methodless enthusiasm" 62 - and utter Congressional absentmindedness. Postmasters General continued unsuccessfully to urge Congressional purchase and development for a while in the Forties to protect
the Government's original stake. Then as the local lines merged and
systems consolidated, the public and editors began calling for effective
regulation. "Postal power," "Commerce," "Commerce among the
States," "Commerce between the States," "interstate Commerce" all were adequate and all apparently were urged. Yet not until 1862
did Congress finally move; then simply to pass the Pacific Telegraph
Act,63 subsidizing the transcontinental line. By 1866, Western Union
having emerged as the "nation's first great industrial monopoly and
its largest corporation, '64 Congress clarified rights across the public
domain and secured the Government's right to purchase lines at appraised value. But not until many years and many hearings later
was there any real national regulation.
Pretty evidently here too, something more than "warping influences"
(pp. 12, 1174) and shifts in the meaning and judicial interpretations of
"regulate," "Commerce," "among," "the States" is involved. No one
will deny that the legislative and constitutional status of corporations
is crucial today; and certainly the telegraph companies were among
the earliest buttonholers and nosethumbers in Washington. But why
pick on the Supreme Court, and its Pensacola doctrine (pp.41-45) Professor Crosskey's only reference to the telegraph business!- as a
cause and example of letting corporate business run riot? Why give
the idea that the Federal Convention intended to regulate intrastate
commerce in 1787 when Congress could not, would not, and did not
regulate even interstate commerce until after 1860?6 Why present
62. See TnoMpsoN, WnUNG A CONTINENT (1947)

(another fine study de-

serving a place on administrative and constitutional law reading lists).
63. 12 STAT. 489-98 (1862).

64. THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 62, at 442.
65. A useful aid in studying the later silences and inaction of Congress under
the Commerce power over railroads is REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COiMnvIERCE
HISTORY OF BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS INTRoDUCED IN CONGRESS . . . 1862-1911

(Briggs Comp. 1912); see also, HANEY, A CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY OF RAILWAYS

IN THE UNITED STATES (1908-1910).
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these as matters of naked constitutional power, and hence of "judicial
sophistry," when they obviously and mainly were matters of political
expediency, sectional and corporate interest, rivalry and politics? Why
divorce constitutional law from the history and circumstances that
explain it? Why complain that Congress has been shortchanged judicially when so much of the trouble was and is that Congress is a
representative body and there were and are a terribly lot of competing
interests and viewpoints to represent? Why ignore, for example, that
for years Congress was unable even to set a uniform gauge for railroads because each competing road naturally wanted its own -and
this fight was no place for a congressman! That the same was true of
6
failure to legislate on bridges across the Ohio at Wheeling in the
67
Congress
Fifties,, and again across the Mississippi in the Sixties.
gallantly bowed out of these fights, then eventually crowned the winners. It simply was the Cumberland Road situation over again, with
the stakes higher and weapons sharper.
Our conclusion is simply that Professor Crosskey's brand of "Politics" is not the staple American article. Too exclusive a diet of case
law and the Annals, and too little attention to news columns, has
given him a jaundiced view of history, and a strange one indeed of
Congress. Congress, in reality has been an indispensable national
undertaker, but a very chary, reluctant entrepreneur. It seldom has
needed to go looking for corpses or trouble. If Crosskey is not the first
to tempt. it, he at least is the first to make temptation retroactive.
Whether that is an anachronism, and if so, whether it is ours or his,
of course depends partly on whether one postulates a Living Constitutional Document or a dead one. Again and again, Crosskey pillories
the "Living Document" school (pp.1171-72); but many, if obliged to refight these battles, will at least be obliged for that choice of weapons.
Time has become a confused and confusing subject in this generation,
since it now really is Space-Time. But for all that this still is a workaday world. To many, John Marshall's "We must never forget it is a
constitution... we are expounding" 68 - "a Constitution meant to endure for ages to come" - seems a simpler, sounder, more heartening
premise and approach than any appeal for constitutional mortmain,
whether judicially or academically derived or enforced. "The earth
belongs to the living," and so does the American Constitution.
Pretty clearly the ultimate, decisive limitation on national legislative power always has been geographic-political, not constitutional.
It is inherent in the size of our country, in the economic and sectional
66. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. 13 How. 518, 14
L. Ed. 249 (U.S. 1852), 18 How. 421, 15 L. Ed. 435 (U.S. 1856).
67. See 2"HANmr, op. cit. supra note 65, at c. 18. Correspondence of members
of the 39th Congress contains many interesting letters from outraged constituents in the states bordering the Mississippi on the tardiness of national
action.
68. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 406, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U.S. 1819).
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diversity, in the competing interests and varying degrees of social and
economic development. These are what really have given content to
"Commerce" -and more often withheld it. What we need most is
not another reraking of the case law and its "sophistries," but a real
synthesis of the case law and the Congressional Silences. Professor
Crosskey has been psychoanalysing the Fathers when he ought to have
been showing us what really defeated Clay's American System and
what made Webster's and Lincoln's tasks so difficult.
Such a synthesis would have provided a better footing, and a much
more convincing reconstitution of the national authority than does so
much of the ex parte brief we are here offered. For it is true beyond
question that many factors did conspire during the early periods to
limit and obscure national legislative powers - at times to the point of
waste and atrophy. The prolonged stalemate over slavery, so often
here stressed, was but one of them. Constitutional positions by themselves, however, seldom were consistently taken or maintained nor can they be in any intricate or protracted social or constitutional
controversy. Abolitionist theory was nationalist in its protection of
civil rights; "states rights" on northern personal liberties laws, mixed
on the problems inherent in fugitive slave rendition. And pro-slave
theory was quite as tangled and inconsistent. Railroad lawyers took
nationalist positions on federal aid for their own road; states rights
on aid for their rivals! Professor Crosskey not only ignores these
situations, but is ready to use virtually any legal argument, regardless
of its origins, if the doctrine itself suits his immediate purpose. Indeed,
the tactic of "using the devil as a character witness" probably never
has been pushed farther than in these pages.69
Beard's "Economic Interpretations" of a generation ago70 were welcome reactions from just this sort of sterile hyper-legalism and
partisanship in constitutional history and interpretation. If Professor
Crosskey now insists on another vacuum repack of our early case law
and congressional argument we undoubtedly are in for another round
of the corrective. Heaven help us: we barely have ceased re-fighting
69. See pp189, 223 [use of Winthrop's Anti-Federalist Agrippa papers on
the scope of the Commerce power; and many similar uses in cc. 8, 9, 23 (pp.
683-85)]. One sometimes wonders what Professor Crosskey would think of an
avowedly historical argument that made use of the American Liberty League
lawyers' logic, citations and "scare talk," at times to beat down the more
moderate constitutional positions taken by the Solicitor General, and, always
with the object of establishing a super-New Deal construction of national
power. Yet essentially this is what we often have here. Is it history, or a
parlor game?
70. BEARD, ECONOvIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UITED
STATES (1913), EcoNoiVtIc ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAx DEMOcRACY (1915), THE
RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1927) (Mary R. Beard, co-author).
Crosskey has a field day exposing Madison's apostasy and sponsorship of the
Virginia -and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. No reference is found to the
States' Rights resolutions of the Federalists in the Hartford Convention,
1815. "Bluffers"?
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the Civil War, and now we are to go back to 1787! Boiler explosions
meanwhile have been superseded by others. Minds like Professor
Crosskey's simply are too few to waste on this business. What we
need and want now is his version of ParadiseRegained.
What, indeed, is a Constitution? 1 That is the basic question this
book raises. Was and is the document a writ of mandate from the
Committees on Detail and Style? Or was it - is it

-

something of an

act of faith and trust and accommodation on the part of many groups
and viewpoints through our whole history? Was it not a series of
compromises in pursuit of union, an agreement at times intentionally
vague and openended, a rough floor plan, not a perfected set of drawings
- much less of architectural specifications -a process, in short, not
simply a lawyers' document.
What it seems to me Professor Crosskey really is telling us is that
constitutional government must always be effective government, and
that our government today is not as effective as it once was, as it
needs to be, as it can be. The world has changed; local action and
local responsibility are not the sovereign rules they once were; too
often they merely are excuses for inaction and evasion. More and more
of our problems are national, but too many of our solutions are not.
Where there are obvious advantages in uniformity and consistency,
and where speed of travel and communication have destroyed the historic and geographic case for localism per se, and tend to leave it 7a2
mere fetish, we need to re-examine our premises and conclusions,
bring our theory up to date- just as the Fathers themselves did between 1776 and 1787.73 As citizens we must face the fact that the

Transportation and Communication Revolutions have erased state lines
for many purposes. Willy-nilly, Congress is now the forum; it must
act as responsibly and efficiently as state and local government once
did. Given our traditions, and given the size and diversity of the
United States, this creates tremendous challenges and obligations.
Geography or not, we must think and act in national terms, exploiting
more effectively the new means of communication, education and enlightenment. So basically, our crisis is not a crisis of constitutional
power so much as it is one of public imagination, insight and action.
Our problems have been pooled increasingly for two generations, but
our solutions have not been, nor are they now.
Much of this is simply implicit in Professor Crosskey's argument.
Could that be why it is so persuasive? The thought thus comes like a
71. Cf. Hamilton, The Constitution-Apropos of Crosskey, 21 U. or Cm.
L. REv. 79, 91-92 (1953).

72. For example, Agrippa's premise, 1788: "All human capacities are limited

to a narrow space." THE FEDERALIST AND OTEmR CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS 554
(Scott ed. 1894).

73. Corwin, Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of
Independence and the Meeting of the PhiladelphiaConvention, 30 Am. HIST.
REv.511 (1925).
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flash: And is that the explanation? Is Politics and the Constitution
really a parable- a masterpiece of constitutional impressionism- a
mirror and a sermon in the form of a brief? Stranger things have
happened in the world of books and faith: Veblen, we know, delighted
in professional scherzos. Tolstoi"wrote War and Peace ostensibly to
prove the illusoriness of free will. Job thought his afflictions unbearable and peculiarly his own. And Saint Thomas More wrote another book besides the Dialogue of Heresies-Utopia.
Like the Sphinx and Congress, Professor Crosskey speaks in riddles
and shouts in silences.

